Report of Virtue Ethics and Animals Essay

inspire 1 Rosalind Hursthouse is a renowned incorrupt philosopher who champions righteousness deterrent examples, one of the three major approaches in normative philosophy. In contrast to deontology and consequentialism, chastity ethics is an agent-centered approach that answers the question of what should I be? while does not provide clear rule or estimable answers on why one should/should not act. (Guidry-Grimes, 1/31/2013) justness ethics empathizes the role of clean-livingistic character embodied by the incorrupt agent for assessing his/her ethical behavior and character.In other word, we think what would a virtuous chaste agent will act under disposed(p) circumstance, and he/she typically does what is virtuous and nullify what is vice. The principles of justice ethics ar the v-rules, to wit thinking in terms of rectitudes and vices, as a virtue person do what is compassionate, do not what is cruel. Applying the v-rules is highly contextual and gravely based on specific circumstances, under which the clean-living agent should gauge what are virtuous to act and avoid effects of vices.Most importantly, in virtue ethics, although virtues and vices are thrustn many vocabulary or ways to describe, in that respect is no rule that specify what the type actions belongs to virtues or vices. For example, compassion hind end be a virtue or a fault depending on specific scenario (Hurtshouse, 126). Therefore, it is important to recognize that determination of virtuous character and what action would deem virtuous is not always forthright and clear. (Hurtshouse, 127) Having established what virtue ethics is, Hursthouse argues that the concept of virtuous attitude is unnecessary and irrelevant for use virtue ethics.Both deontology and consequentialism, two other branches of normative ethics, are firmly depended upon the honourable status concept which essentially divides everything into two classes things with moral status that are deep dow n our wad of concern and deservingwhile of moral principles and things without moral 1Page Ye, Kening Prompt 1 status and are outside of the circle. Hursthouse has pointed out some(prenominal) issues related to the moral status arguments. It is hard to draw a exquisitely line for determining what deem moral status.Things without moral status whoremaster perplex of our moral concern if they eat sentient value and moral worth to those we concern thus they become valuable to us. If to expand the circle of concern to all sentient animals, it becomes over-simplified and snarly for our moral conclusion making as beings with moral status bottom of the inning make competing claims that may implore us to further distinguish their features in order to justify our decision making (Hursthouse, 123).In addition, it is criticized as speciesim if to just keep human beings with moral status. Although Hurtshouse compares and contrasts the characteristics of speciesim and familysm, and co ncludes that giving moral preference for our species, that is to say human beings, is sometimes defective scarcely sometimes right (Hursthouse, 122), other issue is that we sometimes cannot avoid to evaluate the significance of moral worth among members of moral status. In short, the super C consensus is that all humans are within the circle of concern.The moral status arguments not however give human being toughened preference over nonhuman beings but also have instilled priority in decision making for moral agents. As Hursthouse argue, attaching the concept of moral status does not contribute to virtue ethics but only adds complications. If to apply the moral status mood into animal ethics, we are order to act divisively upon two different groups, namely humans and nonhuman animals, in terms of our treatment and attitude.As such, our treatment and attitude toward the groups are a great deal distinguished since preference is always precondition to human beings under po pular circumstance. However, on the other hand, virtue ethics challenges us, as moral agents, to reach out for virtues and deliver actions that are deemed virtuous in nature. This approach is heavily 2Page Ye, Kening Prompt 1 Prompt 1 status and are outside of the circle. Hursthouse has pointed out several issues related to the moral status arguments.It is hard to draw a fine line for determining what deem moral status. Things without moral status can become of our moral concern if they have sentient value and moral worth to those we concern thus they become valuable to us. If to expand the circle of concern to all sentient animals, it becomes over-simplified and problematic for our moral decision making as beings with moral status can make competing claims that may require us to further distinguish their features in order to justify our decision making (Hursthouse, 123).In addition, it is criticized as speciesim if to only keep human beings with moral status. Although Hurtshouse c ompares and contrasts the characteristics of speciesim and familysm, and concludes that giving moral preference for our species, namely human beings, is sometimes wrong but sometimes right (Hursthouse, 122), another issue is that we sometimes cannot avoid to evaluate the significance of moral worth among members of moral status. In short, the common consensus is that all humans are within the circle of concern.The moral status arguments not only give human being strong preference over nonhuman beings but also have instilled priority in decision making for moral agents. As Hursthouse argue, attaching the concept of moral status does not contribute to virtue ethics but only adds complications. If to apply the moral status conception into animal ethics, we are directed to act divisively upon two different groups, namely humans and nonhuman animals, in terms of our treatment and attitude.As such, our treatment and attitude toward the groups are often distinguished since preference is al ways given to human beings under universal circumstance. However, on the other hand, virtue ethics challenges us, as moral agents, to strive for virtues and deliver actions that are deemed virtuous in nature. This approach is heavily 2Page Ye, Kening Prompt 1.